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A Latin Translation ? The Reception of Avicenna in Albert the Great's *De praedicamentis**

STATUS QUAESTIONIS

The aim of the present paper is to discuss the influence of Avicenna on Albert the Great's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. I shall not inspect in detail the whole of Avicenna's reception in this work, which is by itself significant and involves many relevant issues; I will focus, instead, on a particular aspect of this reception, namely the role supposedly played by Avicenna's *Categories* (the *Maqūlāt* of the *Kitāb al-Šifā'*) in the shaping of Albert's doctrine and exegesis. As a matter of fact, though a Latin translation of Avicenna's *Maqūlāt* is neither extant nor attested¹, there has been a scholarly debate on the possibility of its being a source

* *Acknowledgements and preliminary remarks.* I presented a first draft of this article in Paris, at the *Colloque international de doctorants en philosophie arabe* (7-8 october 2016); I thank all the participants for their useful observations. I am also grateful to Amos Bertolacci and the two anonymous referees for their attentive reading of this paper, and their precious remarks; to Silvia Di Vincenzo, for the codicological advice. In the quotations of Albert's works, where not explicitly noted, I normally refer to the available volumes of the *Editio Coloniensis* (1951 - in progress); when citing still unedited texts and commentaries I use, instead, A. Borgnet's edition (1890-99). The references to Avicenna's Arabic text follow the page numbering of the Cairo edition of the *Kitāb al-Šifā'*. For the text of Aristotle's *Categories*, I always quote J. L. Ackrill's English translation (*Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963). All translations from Arabic are mine.

¹ As far as we know, the logical section of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā'* has only been partially translated into Latin. The only work which is fully extant in Latin is the first part, the *Madḥal*, a paraphrase of Porphyry's *Isagoge*: translated in Toledo in the third quarter of the XII century, it was known to the Latins simply as *Logica*. Besides this, there are only fragmentary traces of further translations: Dominicus Gundissalinus' *De divisione philosophiae* contains a Latin version of chapter II.7 of Avicenna's *Burhān* (the section corresponding to Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*), very likely datable to the same period as the *Logica*; whereas to a second phase of translations belong the fragments of Avicenna's *Ḥiṭāba* found in Hermannus Alemannus' Latin translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. For two recent overviews of Avicenna's Latin versions see A. BERTOLACCI, *A community of translators: the Latin medieval versions of Avicenna's Book of the Cure*, in C. J. MEWS, J. N. CROSSLEY eds., *Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe 1100-1500*, Brepols, Turnhout 2011, pp. 37-54; J. JANSSENS, *Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). The Latin translations of*, in H. LAGERLUND ed., *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Between 500 and 1500*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2011, pp. 522-527.

for Albert the Great's *De praedicamentis*. The starting point of this discussion was an article appeared in 1972, by the Italian scholar Mario Grignaschi, entitled *Les traductions latines des ouvrages de la logique arabe et l'abrégé d'Alfarabi*².

In the first part of this contribution Grignaschi presented a state-of-the-art, concerning the Arabic works on logic known to the Latins between the XII and XIII century; among these, he mentioned the fragment of a Latin translation of al-Fārābī's *compendia* on the discipline of logic, discovered some years earlier by Dominique Salman in the manuscript Bruges 424³. He then engaged in a discussion of various issues concerning the composition and transmission of these Farabian *opuscula*, which he treated as a unitary work (a complete synthesis of the Aristotelian logical *corpus*)⁴. In the second part of the article, Grignaschi moved to other, related considerations: given the evidence of a partial Latin translation of Fārābī's *compendia*, he turned to inspect the numerous quotations of Fārābī and Avicenna in Albert the Great's commentaries on logic, so as to establish precisely their source (and to see whether they attested the knowledge of works other than Fārābī's *compendia*). Since the doctrinal material provided by Fārābī's *opuscula* is too synthetic to explain the variety and richness of Albert's quotations, he hypothesized that Albert knew translations both of Fārābī's greater commentaries, and of the logical sections of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā'* posterior to the *Madḥal*. To support his thesis, Grignaschi provided an examination of some of the quotations of Avicenna and Fārābī in Albert the Great's commentaries on logic; he briefly gave an account of their context, and then identified, as their sources, passages of the aforementioned works. This he also did as regards the *De praedicamentis*: he thought — and also tried to demonstrate — that no less than seven quotations of Avicenna in this work drew directly on the *Maqūlāt* of the *Kitāb al-Šifā'*.

² M. GRIGNASCHI, *Les traductions latines des ouvrages de la logique arabe et l'abrégé d'Alfarabii*, « Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge », 39, 1972, pp. 41-107.

³ D. H. SALMAN, *Fragments inédits de la logique d'Alfarabi*, « Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques », 32, 1948, pp. 222-225. The short fragment, entitled *Nota ex logica Alfarabii quaedam sumpta*, is said by N. Rescher (*Al-Fārābī: an annotated bibliography*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1962, pp. 33-34) to correspond — at least in its beginning — to a section of Fārābī's work *Šarā'it al-yaqīn* (*The conditions of certainty*), based on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Janssens argues, instead, that it corresponds partially to the epitome of the *De interpretatione*, partially to a fragment derived, very likely, from the 'Great Book on Music' (*Kitāb al-mūsīqā al-kabīr*). See J. JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance des écrits logiques arabes: une réévaluation du dossier Grignaschi*, in J. BRUMBERG-CHAUMONT ed., *L'Organon dans la translatio studiorum à l'époque d'Albert le Grand*, Brepols, Turnhout 2013, pp. 225-257.

⁴ Nowadays they are rather considered as separate works: see U. RUDOLPH, *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, in U. RUDOLPH, R. WÜRSCH eds., *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: Philosophie in der islamischen Welt* §7.1, Schwabe Verlag, Basel 2012, p. 413; see *ibid.*, pp. 365-366 for a list of critical editions of Fārābī's logical works.

Grignaschi's dossier of quotations was reassessed in 2013 by Jules Janssens, in an essay entitled *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance des écrits logiques arabes : une réévaluation du dossier Grignaschi*. Janssens' core assumption was more economical than Grignaschi's conclusion: it consisted of supposing that the source of these passages might instead be found in Arabic works surely translated into Latin, apparently well-known by Albert, such as the *Madḥal* (Avicenna's *Logica*), the *Metaphysics*, the *Physics* and the *De anima* of the *Kitāb al-Šifā'*. For those few cases where Grignaschi's thesis seems verified, Janssens argued for the likely existence of *florilegia* and fragments of Arabic authors, on which Albert the Great possibly drew⁵.

Against this background, I will here reprise in detail the passages of Albert's *De praedicamentis* discussed by Grignaschi and Janssens, thus narrowing the focus of their — more comprehensive — enquiries; my aim is not to assess conclusively the issue of the Latin translation of Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*, but only to provide further elements of discussion — and to make some more general suggestions regarding Avicenna's import in the *De praedicamentis*. In paragraphs 1-4 I shall discuss the main quotations at stake, following their order of appearance, and the structure of Albert's text; in paragraph 5 I will briefly evaluate one of the Avicennan quotations that Grignaschi did not take into account.

A few words of introduction to Albert's work might be useful. The *De praedicamentis*, composed — according to C. Steel and S. Donati, the authors of the recent critical edition — in 1252⁶, is a part of Albert's exhaustive plan of commentaries on the Aristotelian *corpus*; unlike many commentaries on the *Categories* written in that period, it does not have the form of a commentary *per quaestiones*, but that of a paraphrase of Aristotle's text (such as other 'Aristotelian' works by Albert)⁷. The continuous exegesis of Aristotle's words is interrupted, at times, by independent sections and digressions, essentially devoted to the discussion of doubts concerning the text (though they may, sometimes, develop original reflexions of Albert on Aristotle's doctrine). As a matter of fact, though Albert's originality in logic has been questioned by scholars, his work on the *Categories* presents indeed many aspects of interest⁸.

⁵ JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance* cit., pp. 256-257.

⁶ ALB., *De praed.*, Prolegomena, p. V. For a review of the *editio coloniensis* of the *De praedicamentis*, see N. CAMINADA, Review of: *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, t. I, p. IB: *De praedicamentis*, « Studi medievali » terza serie, 58/1, 2017, pp. 416-420.

⁷ For an overview of the main commentaries on the *Categories* written in the 13th century, see R. ANDREWS, *Question Commentaries on the Categories in the thirteenth Century*, « Medioevo », 26, 2001, pp. 265-326; a recent focus on the first half of the century is provided by H. HANSEN, *John Pagus on Aristotle's Categories. A Study and Edition of the Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2012 (*Introductory study*, pp. 40-49).

⁸ For a general evaluation of Albert's contributions to logic see S. EBBESEN, *Albert (the Great?)'s companion to the Organon*, in A. ZIMMERMANN ed., *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung*, « Miscellanea Medievalia », 14, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1981, pp. 89-103 (reprint in S. EBBESEN,

On the Latin side, the major sources of the *De praedicamentis* are presumably Boethius and a contemporary of Albert, Robert Kilwardby, the author of a book of *Notulae* on Aristotle's *Categories*, from which Albert took many of the *dubitabilia* discussed in the aporetic sections⁹. As to the Greek sources, Albert was probably unable to consult directly any late ancient commentary on the *Categories*; if we trust the chronology proposed by the editors, Simplicius' commentary was translated into Latin later (by William of Moerbeke, in 1266)¹⁰. As concerns the Arabic sources, the authors quoted by Albert are al-Fārābī, Avicenna, al-Ġazālī, Averroes and 'Mescalach' (the astronomer Mašā'allāh)¹¹; he seems not to have known (or, at least, used) Averroes' middle commentary on the *Categories*, since all the quotations of Averroes in the *De praedicamentis* rather refer to physical or metaphysical discussions¹².

As regards Avicenna, the works to which Albert refers by name in the *De praedicamentis* are the *Physics* (*Samā' ṭabī'i*) of the *Šifā'* (mentioned in Latin as *Sufficientia*), of which Albert probably knew only the first two books and the beginning of the third¹³; the *Liber sextus de naturalibus* (Avicenna's *De anima*, *Kitāb*

Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th-14th centuries. Collected essays of Sten Ebbesen, vol. 2, Furnham/Surrey – Burlington 2008, pp. 95-108). For recent, specific contributions on Albert's commentary see B. TREMBLAY, *Albertus Magnus: On the Subject of Aristotle's Categories*, in L. P. NEWTON ed., *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2008, pp. 73-97; ID., *Albertus Magnus on the Problem of the Division of the Categories*, « Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale », 27, 2016, pp. 303-345.

⁹ Kilwardby's *Notulae* are available on-line in A. Conti's provisional transcription (URL: http://www-static.cc.univaq.it/diri/lettere/docenti/conti/Allegati/Kilwardby_praedicamenta.pdf). Kilwardby's influence on Albert was analysed in detail by C. Steel (*Albert's use of Kilwardby's Notulae in his paraphrase of the Categories*, in *Via Alberti. Texte-Quellen-Interpretationen*, Aschendorff, Münster 2009, pp. 481-507).

¹⁰ For the date and the attribution of Simplicius' Latin translation, see *Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. A. PATTIN, in collaboration with W. STUYVEN, Publications universitaires de Louvain, Louvain – Paris 1971-1975 (vol. I, pp. xi-xxiii).

¹¹ A complete list of Albert's quotations of Mašā'allāh is found in A. CORTABARRIA, *Fuentes árabes de San Alberto Magno: el astrónomo Mashallah*, « Estudios Filosóficos », 34, 1985, pp. 400-415.

¹² The translation of Averroes' middle commentary (*Talḥiṣ*) on Aristotle's *Categories* is attributed to Guillelmus de Luna; it is extant and edited by R. Hissette, with the collaboration of A. Bertolacci (*Averroes latinus, Commentum medium super librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis. Translatio Wilhelmo de Luna adscripta*, Peeters, Leuven 2010).

¹³ Whereas books I-III.1 were translated in Toledo by an anonymous author, part of the third book (III. 1-10) was translated later in Burgos by Johannes Gonsalvi and a certain Salomon, between 1275 and 1280 (See BERTOLACCI, *A Community of Translators* cit., pp. 39-46). In the *De praedicamentis*, Avicenna's *Sufficientia* is mentioned twice (ALB., *De praed.*, III.1, p. 50.13; III.7, p. 62.54). The first and the second book of this translation are edited (AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber primus naturalium. Tractatus primus de causis et principiis naturalis*, ed. by S. VAN RIET, Peeters – Brill, Louvain-la-Neuve – Leiden 1992; AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber primus naturalium II. De motu et de consimilibus*, edd. S. VAN RIET, J. JANSSENS, A. ALLARD, Académie Royale de Belgique, Bruxelles 2006).

al-nafs)¹⁴; quite curiously, even his *Categories* (*Praedicamenta*), that are recalled only once — in a passage from the third chapter of the first treatise. From this passage I shall start, now, my discussion.

1. HOMONYMY AND SYNONYMY

De praed., I.3 is a chapter devoted to the discussion of homonyms, and other sorts of commonness or dissimilarity of names and definitions¹⁵. Besides homonyms (*equivoca*), synonyms (*univoca*) and paronyms (*denominativa*), in line with the previous exegetical tradition, Albert mentions here the cases of polyonyms (*multivoca* or *synonyma*), namely things bearing the same definition but different names, and heteronyms (*diversivoca*), namely things having different definitions and different names. Since polyonyms and heteronyms, as is known, are not mentioned or discussed by Aristotle, near the end of the chapter Albert precises the reason for their customary treatment in the exegesis of the *Categories*:

T1: ALBERT, *De praed.*, I.3, p. 10.13-22:

« Attendendum autem est quod, quamvis multivoca sive synonyma et diversivoca non sint de his, quibus praedicabile ordinatur in linea generis — eo quod synonyma respiciunt unum particulare vel speciale per diversas proprietates, quae sunt in illo multis significatae nominibus, diversivoca autem, sicut sunt diversa nomina, sic diversis attribuuntur —, tamen, quia et AVICENNA et ALGAZEL et IOHANNES DAMASCENUS in suis PRAEDICAMENTIS ponunt ista, et nos ea hic ponemus, non ad necessitatem scientiae, sed ad doctrinae perfectionem ».

This reference is taken by Grignaschi as a sign of Albert's knowledge of Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*, since in the section of *Maqūlāt* devoted to homonyms (I.2) Avicenna effectively deals with polyonyms and heteronyms¹⁶. However, other possible ways to explain this passage have been proposed. For instance, C. Steel

¹⁴ Avicenna's *Nafs* was translated in Toledo in the XII century by Gundissalinus and Avendeuth. This translation is extant, and edited in two volumes: AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus* IV-V, ed. by S. VAN RIET, Peeters - Brill, Louvain-la-Neuve 1968; AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus* I-III, ed. S. VAN RIET, Peeters - Brill, Louvain-la-Neuve 1972. For Albert's quotation, see ALB., *De praed.*, I.4, p. 11.20; the doctrine quoted there by Albert seems, however, not to be exactly traceable in the *De anima* (see the editors' note *ad loc.*).

¹⁵ Namely, Albert's commentary on the first chapter of the *Categories* (ARIST., *Cat.*, I, a1-15).

¹⁶ GRIGNASCHI, *Les traductions latines* cit., pp. 69-70. For Avicenna's discussion of homonyms and synonyms, and particularly his treatment of *multivoca* and *diversivoca*, see *Maqūlāt*, I.2 (pp. 9.1 - 17.14, notably pp. 15.16 - 16.3). Avicenna's reworking of *Cat.*, I is dealt with by A. BÄCK, *Avicenna the Commentator*, in NEWTON ed., *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories* cit., pp. 31-71.

and S. Donati, in their critical edition, mention R. Andrews' suggestion that it may be possible to read 'Augustinus' instead of 'Avicenna' here — on the basis of a similar emendation made by them further in the text¹⁷. As the pseudo-augustinian treatise entitled *Categoriae decem* also reports this doctrine, this solution is certainly viable¹⁸; nonetheless, it seems not to be sufficiently supported by manuscript evidence (as witnessed by the editors' choice of maintaining 'Avicenna'). Janssens, instead, proposes to identify the true referent of this quotation with the sole al-Ġazālī, on account of the following considerations: since the Ghazalian text familiar to Albert is the Latin translation of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, which — as is known — draws on Avicenna's *Dānešnāme-ye 'Alā'ī*, it is evident that Albert holds Ġazālī to be a follower of Avicenna (so as to call him, in the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, *abbreviator Avicennae*¹⁹). Since the 'logic' of Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid*, even in the Latin translation, reports the doctrine of polyonyms and heteronyms, it is not unlikely that Albert held this section to be derived from a corresponding section of Avicenna's commentary²⁰.

¹⁷ ALB., *De praed.*, IV.7, p. 93.51-61: «Ex his autem quae dicta sunt, quod scilicet relativa ad convertentiam dicuntur, sequitur aliud proprium relativorum, quod est quod relativa sive ea quae sunt *ad aliquid*, videntur simul esse natura. Quod autem secundum convertentiam dicuntur et quod simul sunt natura differunt in hoc quod convertentia est secundum mutuam relationem eorum ad invicem in appellatione et casu, sed simul esse natura est in hoc quod, secundum quod relativa sunt, in esse et non esse sive in ortu et occasu, ut dicit Augustinus (Jammy, Borgnet: Avicenna), sunt simul, ita quod posito uno in esse, secundum quod relativum est, ponitur et aliud, secundum quod refertur ad istud, et destructo uno, secundum quod relativum est, destruitur et aliud secundum relationem, secundum quam refertur ad istud». In this passage the doctrine is attributed to Avicenna, according to the text of Jammy's and Borgnet's editions; the reason for the error seems to be the mistaken reading of an abbreviation. As a consequence, Grignaschi included this quotation in his dossier (*Les traductions latines* cit., pp. 72-73). Once we accept, with the editors of the *coloniensis*, the reading 'Augustine', the source is then clearly identifiable with the ps.-Augustine's *Categoriae decem* (*Aristoteles Latinus*, I.1-5, p. 155.12-17: «Tunc ergo et vere et proprie 'ad aliquid' dicitur cum sub uno ortu atque occasu et id quod iungitur et id cui iungitur invenitur»; the expression *in ortu et occasu* is also attributed to Augustine by R. Kilwardby, *Notulae*, p. 86, 13-15 [ed. CONTI]: «Unde 'simul natura' dicitur hic ut simul natura dicitur esse ab Augustino, simul esse secundum ortum et occasum; haec enim posita se, ponunt, destructa se, destruunt»). The reference to Andrews in the critical edition occurs at p. 10, in the note to lines 19-21.

¹⁸ ARISTOTELES LATINUS, I.1-5, p. 136.10-25.

¹⁹ See for instance ALB., *Metaphys.*, I [l. I-V], p. 217.28. On this point see A. BERTOLACCI, *Subtilius speculando. Le citazioni della Philosophia prima di Avicenna nel Commento alla Metafisica di Alberto Magno*, «Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale», 9, 1998, pp. 261-339 (in particular pp. 333-334).

²⁰ Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* were translated into Latin in the XII century, under the title *Summa theorie philosophie*, by Gundissalinus and a certain 'Magister Johannes': the logical section has been edited by C. Lohr (*Logica Algazelis. Introduction and Critical Text*, «Traditio», 21, 1965, pp. 223-292), the physical and metaphysical section has been edited by J. T. Muckle (*Algazel's Metaphysics. A Mediaeval Translation*, ed. by J. T. MUCKLE, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1967). Algazel's discussion of *multivoca* and *diversivoca* is found in LOHR, *Logica Algazelis*, p. 246.79-82: «Diversivoca sunt multa nomina eiusdem rei, ut 'ensis', 'mucro', 'gladius'. Multivoca sunt multa nomina multarum rerum, ut 'equus' et 'asinus', quae sunt singula singularum rerum».

This hypothesis is also corroborated, as Janssens remarks, by the fact that the examples mentioned by Albert for polyonyms are identical with those found in Algazel's *Logica*²¹. To Janssens' convincing arguments I add that Albert might have at least surmised the existence of an Avicennan treatment of the *Categories*, from the retrospective references which are sometimes found in the sections of the *Šifā'* he certainly knew, for instance in the *Ilāhiyyāt*, Avicenna's *Metaphysics*²². A clear reference of this kind is found at least in the beginning of *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.1, a chapter devoted to verifying the accidental existence of the main four accidental properties, i.e. quantity, quality and relation: here Avicenna explicitly recalls the treatment of the accidental categories carried out «in the beginning of logic» (*in principio logicae*)²³.

In the same chapter of the *De praedicamentis*, Grignaschi finds what he holds to be another possible reference to Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*; the context is Albert's discussion of synonyms and, consequently, of synonymous predication. After commenting on Aristotle's claim that man and ox share the same notion of 'animal', Albert argues that the principle of synonymous predication does not exclusively apply to genera, species and differentiae, but also to the 'accidental' predicables such as property and common accident. As a source for this doctrine, he cites Avicenna and Gāzālī:

T2: ALBERT, *De praed.*, I.3, p. 9.11-14:

«[...] unde, si quis assignet utriusque ratione, hominis scilicet et bovis, secundum hoc quo sunt animalia, hoc est secundum naturam, de qua notam facit nomen commune, quod est animal, eandem de necessitate assignabit utriusque, hominis

²¹ JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance* cit., p. 244. Algazel's examples ('ensis, mucro, gladius') are effectively identical with those found in ALB., *De praed.*, I.3, p. 10.24-25 ('ensis, mucro, spata, gladius').

²² Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt* was translated into Latin, probably by Gundissalinus, in Toledo. A critical edition of this translation is available: AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, I-IV, ed. S. VAN RIET, Peeters - Brill, Louvain-la-Neuve - Leiden 1977; AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, V-X, ed. S. VAN RIET, Peeters - Brill, Louvain-la-Neuve - Leiden 1980; AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, *Lexiques* by S. VAN RIET, Peeters - Brill, Louvain-la-Neuve - Leiden 1983. Albert the Great's reception of Avicenna's metaphysics has been studied in detail by BERTOLACCI, *Subtilius speculando* cit.; ID., *Le citazioni implicite testuali della Philosophia prima di Avicenna nel Commento alla Metafisica di Alberto Magno: analisi tipologica*, «Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale», 12, 2001, pp. 179-274; ID., *The Reception of Avicenna's Philosophia prima in Albert the Great's Commentary on the Metaphysics: The Case of the Doctrine of Unity*, in W. SENNER ET AL. ed., *Albertus Magnus 1200-2000. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2001, pp. 67-78.

²³ AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima* I-IV, p. 104.5-11: «Necesse est igitur ut procedamus ad certificandum accidentia et stabiliendum ea. Dicam igitur quod in principio logicae iam cognovisti quidditatem decem praedicamentorum [...]».

scilicet et bovis, *rationem* diffinitivam. Et similiter est de Socrate et Platone in hoc nomine ‘homo’. Et sic est in omnibus, quae ut genus vel ut species vel ut differentia vel ut proprium vel etiam ut accidens sub eodem nomine praedicantur, ut dicunt AVICENNA ET ALGAZEL ».

Grignaschi sees a plausible source for this quotation in *Maqūlāt*, I.2, notably in a passage where Avicenna explicitly denies that only genus, species and differentia are predicated synonymously:

T3: AVICENNA, *Maqūlāt*, I.2, p. 15.2-5:

«It is absolutely not as it was thought, namely that only genus, species and differentia are those which fall synonymously [on their subjects], and the others not; this because synonymy is not such because of the notion’s being essential, but because of its being one in meaning, and not differentiated. This unity may exist in what is essential, and may [also] exist in what is accidental, such as properties and common accidents»²⁴.

Grignaschi’s mention of this passage is certainly appropriate, since it undoubtedly states what Albert ascribes to Avicenna; however, the idea that even accidental universals are predicated synonymously is already rooted in Avicenna’s *Madḥal* (*Logica*), where it is alluded to more than once²⁵. This does not make it necessary to hypothesize Albert’s direct knowledge of Avicenna’s *Maqūlāt*, though there – for sure – this idea is reprised and developed²⁶; nor to figure out, as Janssens does, a construction of other passages from the *Logica*²⁷. What is truly problematic seems to be – instead – the mention of Algazel, whose *Logica* does not apparently report such a doctrine²⁸; I guess that he might be

²⁴ For another translation of this and the following passages from *Maqūlāt*, see the recent English version published by A. Bäck (AVICENNA/IBN SİNĀ, *Al-Maqulat. Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories*, Philosophia Verlag, München 2016).

²⁵ See for instance *Logica*, p. 9va, where it is said that all of the five predicables are predicated in the same way (namely, synonymously): « haec quinque praedicantur uno modo, sicut iam saepe diximus » (*Madḥal*, I.14, p. 85.11-12); *Logica*, p. 10ra (*Madḥal*, II.1, p. 91.12-19). For Avicenna’s account of synonymous predication in the *Madḥal* of the *Šifā*, see S. DI VINCENZO, *Avicenna’s reworking of Porphyry’s ‘common accident’ in the light of Aristotle’s Categories*, « Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale », 27, 2016, pp. 163-194.

²⁶ This occurs not only in chapter I.2, but also in chapter I.3: see N. CAMINADA, *A quotation of an anonymous ‘logician’ in Avicenna’s Categories*, « Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale », 27, 2016, pp. 195-237.

²⁷ JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance* cit., pp. 244-245.

²⁸ As Janssens remarks (*ibid.*) there is, in Algazel’s *Logica*, nothing more than a division of the universals (LOHR, *Logica Algazelis*, pp. 249.90 - 252.190).

mentioned here by Albert, however, in order to reinforce Avicenna's authority, as a further instance of the doctrinal agreement that Albert always sees between Avicenna and Algazel (as presumably happens elsewhere, in *De praed.* as well as in other Albertine commentaries)²⁹.

2. SUBSTANCE AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE

As regards the second treatise of Albert's *De praedicamentis*, devoted to the category of substance, Grignaschi confesses he was not able to find real doctrinal similarities between it and the corresponding sections of Avicenna's *Maqūlāt* (ch. III 1-3)³⁰. It is indeed clear that, in this section, Albert seems not to have borrowed relevant doctrinal elements from Avicenna's *Categories*; of the four explicit quotations of Avicenna found here, three are surely related to the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā'* and the *Logica* (*Madḥal*)³¹. For the last case only Grignaschi suggests a textual parallel: it concerns Albert's discussion of one of the properties which Aristotle accords to substance, namely not being receptive of more and less (and the related issue of substantial change). Among the authorities mentioned in favour of this doctrine, Albert recalls Porphyry and Avicenna:

T4: ALBERT, *De praed.*, II.10, pp. 40.54 - 41.9:

«Et hoc modo substantia non potest suscipere magis et minus, cuius causa in SCIENTIA DE UNIVERSALIBUS reddita est a PORPHYRIO, quia esse substantiale semper idem et simplex est, et ideo non potest suscipere magis et minus, quia, sicut probat AVICENNA, si magis susciperet, tunc in eo magis susciperet, quod ipsum esse substantiale plus formae substantiali appropinquaret per ipsius formae adaptionem, quod falsum est, cum nihil medium habeat; inter esse enim et non esse nihil est medium, sicut inter album et nigrum multa sunt media. Et ideo secundum esse substantiale non potest esse intensio et remissio in aliquo».

As to the mention of Porphyry's 'science of universals', the source is clear: in the chapter of the *Isagoge* on *differentia* Porphyry, after distinguishing between separable and inseparable differences, subdivides these latter into *per se* and *per accidens*; he then says that inseparable differences *per se*, which may be said 'substantial' (i.e. constitutive of the essence of a thing), do not admit of more and

²⁹ A. Bertolacci, for instance, records a similar case in Albert's *Metaphysics*, and makes the hypothesis that Albert mentions *Algazel* only because of his constant agreement with Avicenna's opinion (*Subtilius speculando* cit., p. 275).

³⁰ GRIGNASCHI, *Les traductions latines* cit., p. 70.

³¹ ALB., *De praed.*, II.1, p. 21.53-60 and II.3, p. 25.55-64 (related to the *Philosophia prima*); II.8, p. 38.16-19 (related to the *Logica*).

less; and the same holds for genera. If genera and differences, which constitute the definition and essence of a thing, do not admit of more and less, 'being' itself (εἶναι, which is presumably to be understood as 'essence') does not admit of more and less³². The same point is made in the second part of the *Isagoge*, as Porphyry clarifies the common features of the predicables 'difference' and 'accident': here it is said that differentiae do not admit of more and less, while accidents do³³.

As to the likely source of Avicenna's quotation, Grignaschi mentions a short passage from chapter III.3 of Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*, devoted to the properties of substance; here Avicenna explains the fact that substances do not admit of more and less as depending directly on the fact that substances have no contraries, since the more and the less are only found in between contraries³⁴. Though not unrelated to Albert's point, this passage does not fit very well as the *locus* supposedly quoted by Albert, since it never refers to the absence of intermediates, which instead plays an important role in Albert's account. Grignaschi could have mentioned another passage, found only a few lines below, where Avicenna states – in convoluted terms – that change in substance may only occur abruptly:

T5: AVICENNA, *Maqūlāt*, III.3, p. 107.8-10:

«Moreover, the way of contrariety which was not severely denied to substances, belongs to what does not allow the progression from some [substances] to others according to intension and remission. Thus, not all contraries are such that the transition from some of them to others occurs in such a way³⁵; but sometimes it happens all at once».

³² ARISTOTELES LATINUS, I 6-7, p. 16.1-12: «Illae igitur quae per se sunt, in substantiae ratione accipiuntur et faciunt aliud; illae vero quae secundum accidens, nec in substantiae ratione dicuntur nec faciunt aliud, sed alteratum. Et illae quidem quae per se sunt non suscipiunt magis et minus, illae vero quae per accidens (vel si inseparabiles sint) intentionem recipiunt et remissionem; nam neque genus magis et minus praedicatur cuius fuerit genus, neque generis differentiae secundum quas dividitur; ipsae enim sunt quae uniuscuiusque rationem {definitionem} complent, esse autem unicuique unum et idem neque intentionem neque remissionem suscipiens est, aquilum autem esse vel simum vel coloratum aliquo modo et intenditur et remittitur», (PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 9.14-18 Busse).

³³ ARISTOTELES LATINUS, I 6-7, p. 29.13-14: «Et differentia quidem inintendibilis est et inremissibilis, accidentia vero magis et minus recipiunt» (PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 20.3-5 Busse).

³⁴ AVICENNA, *Maqūlāt*, III.3, p. 107.1-3: «This property (i.e. the fact that substances have no contraries) is followed by another one, namely the fact that substance does not admit of more and less. For what becomes 'more' [of something], intensifies from a certain state which is contrary to the state towards which it intensifies; hence, it does not cease leaving the state of weakness little by little, being directed towards strength, or [leaving] the state of strength, being directed towards the state of weakness».

³⁵ I.e., according to intension and remission.

The 'way of contrariety' which must not be totally denied to substances is contrariety without intermediaries, which admits of abrupt changes (instead of gradually deployed ones). Therefore, even if we accept that substance has contraries, its contrariety does not necessarily entail a variation in degrees.

Otherwise, as Porphyry's statement concerning the unity and unchangeability of being is reprised by Avicenna in the *Madḥal*, the relevant passage in this latter may be seen as a likely source for Albert (as it is, in fact, according to Janssens and the critical editors)³⁶:

T6: AVICENNA, *Logica*, p. 9r a-b (= *Madḥal*, pp. 80.15 - 81.6):

«Dicemus autem nunc quod essentia uniuscuiusque rei una est. Oportet ergo ut essentia rei nec augeatur nec minuat. Si enim esse rei et essentia esset idem quod est minimum³⁷ inter terminos antedictae divisionis; sed quod est augmentatum est praeter diminutum; tunc augmentum est praeter esse rei. Similiter si esse eius esset id quod est diminutum; similiter si esset esse mediocre. Intentio autem communis tribus quae non est una numero non est ipsa essentia rei quae est una numero. Non enim potest dici quod augmentatum et diminutum conveniant in una intentione quae sit essentia; ergo essentia rei non recipit magis et minus. Si autem augeatur, constituitur eius essentia ex eius augmento; tunc eius essentia est magis. Si vero eius essentia non constituitur ex aumento sed ex diminutione, tunc eius essentia est minus; si vero ex nullo eorum constituitur, tunc non est constituta ex augmento aut diminutione: sed ex intentione communi»³⁸.

Avicenna's argument here is the following: since essence is one by number, it cannot admit of more and less. The reason for this is the fact that, being the

³⁶ JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance* cit., pp. 245-246.

³⁷ The Venice print has here *verum*, as a translation for the Arabic *anqas* (lesser); however, at least one Latin manuscript (Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale VIII.E.33) reads *minimum*, which seems more correct and preferable. I thank Françoise Hudry for the information about the Naples manuscript, which is the basis of her forthcoming critical edition of Avicenna's *Logica* (*Logica Avicennae. Traduction latine médiévale de Avicenne, aṣ-Ṣifā', al-Madkhal*. Édition critique annotée accompagnée d'une recherche des sources grecques, par F. HUDRY, Paris, Éditions Vrin, coll. Sic et Non).

³⁸ The original Arabic reads as follows: «We now say that the essence of every thing is one, so the essence of every thing must not become more, nor less; for if the quiddity, and the essence of a thing is the lesser among the limits of augmentation and diminution, and the bigger is other than the lesser, then the bigger is other than the essence [of the thing]. Likewise if the thing were the bigger, and the intermediate. As to the notion shared by the three [of them], which is not one numerically, but by generality [*bi-l- 'umūm*, omitted in the Latin], it is not the essence of the thing, numerically one; so you cannot say that the more, the less and the intermediate share in a single meaning which is the essence of the thing. Therefore, the essence of the thing does not undergo augmentation and diminution; so, what is constitutive of the essence does not undergo augmentation and diminution [*fa-mā kāna muqawwiman li-ḍātihī lā yaḥtamilu l-ziyādata wa-l-nuqṣāna*, omitted in the Latin].

two limits of intensification and weakening different things, the essence may not correspond to both things (as intensified entities do, though in different times) without losing its numerical unity; the same would hold for the intermediate states (which again, on their part, are different from the extremes). I think that there are reasons to dismiss this passage as a potential source of Albert's quotation: first, it does not present a doctrine such as that attributed to Avicenna in T4, since the point in Albert's quotation is the absence of intermediate states in substantial change (which is not the case here); secondly, at least in a truly Avicennan perspective, 'essence' is not identical with 'substance': the argument in T6 applies, thus, to the essence of every being endowed with a genus and a difference (even accidents), contrary to what Albert reports. It is true, however, that Albert also uses *substantia* and *substantialis* in the sense of 'essence' and 'essential', which might justify the two notions' overlap in this context. Janssens convincingly suggests that this passage needs to be completed by means of another source, namely the *Physics* of the *Šifā'*, where the immediate nature of substantial change is actually stated very clearly (and widely discussed, in the third chapter of the second book)³⁹:

T7: AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber primus naturalium*, II.3, p. 187.16-17 (= *Samā' ṭabī'ī*, II.3, p. 98.9-12):

«Et dicemus quod hoc quod dicimus, quod in substantia est motus, est dictio impropria quia in hac categoria non cadit motus. Natura enim substantialis, cum destruitur, destruitur subito, et cum generatur, generatur subito, et non invenitur inter eius potentiam puram et eius effectum purum perfectio media, quia forma substantialis non suscipit magis et minus».

There are two possible solutions, then: Albert might either, according to Grignaschi's hypothesis, have followed Avicenna's doctrine as expounded in *Maqūlāt*, III.3 (T5); or he might have completed Avicenna's interpretation of Porphyry's passage in the *Madḥal* (T6) with the *Samā' ṭabī'ī* (T7), or a similar passage found elsewhere. Given — however — the substantial difference between the arguments of T6 and T7, and the fact that this latter is closer in meaning and wording to Albert's quotation, the source might be very likely the *Samā' ṭabī'ī* alone⁴⁰. The *Maqūlāt*-

³⁹ JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance* cit., p. 246. As Janssens remarks, «ici, l'absence d'augmentation ou de diminution dans la forme substantielle est présente *expressis verbis*».

⁴⁰ An implicit quotation of T5, which definitely conveys the sense of Avicenna's argument in the *Logica*, may be found instead in another passage of *De praed.* (I.3, p. 8.43-51: «Et ita et nominata natura et ratio impositionis nominis erit una in talibus, ut sit et ratio substantiae et ratio substantialis eadem simul in his quae sunt univoca et quod illa natura in eis sit participata aequaliter, quod non secundum magis et minus nec secundum prius et posterius sit in ipsis sed uno modo, sicut esse est unum. Quod si magis et minus susciperet, non esset unum omnino, sicut in antehabitis determinatum est et in libro De universalibus»).

hypothesis is, in this case as well, not very economical, since it is possible to trace clearly Avicenna's position in a text certainly known to the Latins.

3. QUANTITY: THE COUPLE LARGE/SMALL AND THE RELATIVE NATURE OF CONTRARIES

In the third treatise of Albert's *De praedicamentis* (*Tractatus de quantitate*) there is only one quotation of interest. The context where it is found is the discussion of the properties of quantity, which is said by Aristotle to have no contraries: as is known, in this section of the *Categories* Aristotle is especially committed to explaining why the couple large/small, which seems to consist of two contrary quantities, is neither a couple of contraries nor a couple of quantities. One of the arguments Aristotle sets forth is the following: since large and small are relative notions, a same thing may be said 'large' with respect to a thing, 'small' with respect to another. If we accept this, and we hold large and small to be contraries as well, we are presented with the paradox of a same thing admitting of two contraries simultaneously, which would lead to the absurd consequence of something being a contrary of itself⁴¹. As an authority on the relative nature of contraries, Albert recalls Avicenna:

T8: ALBERT, *De praed.*, III.11, pp. 73.61 - 74.1:

«*Contingit etiam, ut diximus, eadem sibiipsis esse contraria. Nam si magnum parvo est contrarium, sed iam probatum est quod ipsum simul magnum et parvum est, sequitur quod ipsum sibiipsi contrarium est. Et hoc sequitur ex hoc, quia quod comparatum alicui formam recipit contrarii, illud simpliciter habet formam illam, et si alii comparatum habet formam alterius contrarii, sequitur quod simpliciter habet etiam illam, quia contrariae formae, quibus insunt, simpliciter insunt, eo quod non sunt formae comparisonis, ut dicit AVICENNA, sed sunt qualitates absolutae*».

This doctrine — as formulated here — is very interesting, since it mirrors Avicenna's point on this topic in *Maqūlāt*: it needs, therefore, to be discussed in detail. Grignaschi cites, as a source for this passage, the chapter of *Maqūlāt* where Avicenna deals with the properties of quantity (IV.2). After having mentioned the case of the couple large/small, Avicenna makes a general statement concerning all the properties which are wrongly thought to be contrary quantities:

T9: AVICENNA, *Maqūlāt*, IV.2, p. 137.3-7:

«*Know that the examples that have been mentioned regarding the statement that there is contrariety in quantities, are — all of them — accidents of quantity, and*

⁴¹ ARIST., *Cat.*, 5b30–6a11.

they are not quantities, as you have learned; moreover, there is no contrariety in them, for contrariety is only found between two natures, each one of which is intelligible by itself, and then if it is put in relation to the other it is said to be contrary to the other. Like heat and coldness; because each one of them is intelligible by itself, then if it is put in relation to the other it is contrary to it. So, there is a nature to which there accidentally belongs a relation (*iḍāfa*), which is the relation of contrariety».

There is here no literal correspondence to the distinction, found in Albert, between *forma simpliciter* and *forma comparisonis*; still, the doctrine seems to be — after all — the same: contraries are by themselves absolute things, natures intelligible by themselves and are not — by themselves — relative. Albert however does not add explicitly in T8, as Avicenna does in T9, that contrariety — insofar as it is contrariety — is a super-added ‘relation’ (a point on which Avicenna also insists in *Maqūlāt*, VII.2, a pivotal chapter for his doctrine of the contraries, mentioned by Grignaschi in a note⁴²); it will be clear nonetheless, from a further Albertine reference to *comparisonis forma* (see below §4.1, T11 and the related discussion) that Albert seems to have known the Avicennan doctrine of the relational character of contrariety, a doctrine which apparently prompted him to present Avicenna as an advocate of a conceptualist doctrine of relations. The doctrinal similarity between T8 and T9 seems to verify, at least for these passages, Grignaschi’s conjecture; however, Avicenna’s effort towards a coherent and systematic presentation of his philosophy in all his major works, and especially in the *Šifā’*, makes it likely that the same doctrine expounded in one place is alluded to somewhere else; this being the case, other hypotheses must be taken into account to explain Albert’s quotation.

Janssens proposes, as a likely source for T8, a passage of *Samā’ ṭabī’ī*, II.3 where Avicenna deals with motion in the category of quantity: this passage does not provide a parallel for the nature of contrariety in general, but presents the idea of ‘absolute’ largeness and smallness in quantitative change (which suits well Albert’s quotation in T8)⁴³. We can also take into account another possibility:

⁴² GRIGNASCHI, *Les traductions latines cit.*, p. 71 n. 40. The treatise is here erroneously indicated as ‘fourth’ treatise (*‘Al-maḳālatu-r-rābi’a’*). The chapter is entitled ‘On doubts related to what was said concerning opposition’ (*Fī šukūk talḥaḳ mā ḡila fī l-taḳābul*); it is the second of a series of two chapters dealing with Aristotle’s theory of opposites (as outlined in *Cat.*, 11b15-13b35. For the relational character of contrariety, see especially *Maqūlāt*, VII.2, pp. 249.12 - 250.1; 252.18 - 253.2.

⁴³ JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance cit.*, pp. 246-247; *Liber primus naturalium*, II.3, pp. 195.56 - 196.67 (*Samā’ ṭabī’ī*, II.3, p. 102.9-15): « Sed iam dubitatur quod magnum et parvum non sunt contraria, cum motus omnes sint inter contraria, et dicemus ad hoc quod nos non cogimur affirmare quod omnes motus sint inter contraria tantum et non in aliis. Cum enim fuerint aliqua opposita quae non convenient simul et processerit res de uno ad aliud paulatim, vocamus

though the most detailed treatment of opposition and contrariety in the *Šifā'* (and, probably, in the whole of Avicenna's *corpus*) is found in the seventh treatise of *Maqūlāt*, the issue is also discussed in the seventh treatise of the *Metaphysics* (*Ilāhiyyāt*), notably in the first chapter, devoted to the attributes of unity and multiplicity. Most of the discussion of contraries found in this context is aimed at denying that contraries are to be found in different genera; it is true, instead, that contraries are always found in the same genus. While restating this notion of contrariety, Avicenna addresses critically the opinion of some unidentified philosophers, named in Arabic 'the superficial theorists' (*ahl al-ẓāhir min al-naẓar*), who group certain contraries under two genera: *convenientia* (*muwāfaqa*) and *diversitas* (*muḥālafa*), according to their being either congruent with the acquisitions of perception and intellect, or their being — instead — incongruent with them⁴⁴. Avicenna argues that all these contraries are not, by themselves, congruent or incongruent, but that they are instead by themselves qualities, upon which some other concomitants or accidents are super-added (for instance relations, in the case of congruence and incongruence):

T10 : AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, VII.1, pp. 353.87 - 354.10 (= AVICENNA, *Ilāhiyyāt*, VII.1, pp. 306.9 - 307.8) :

«Videtur autem quod qui non bene consideraverunt hoc, intellexerunt quod eorum quae sunt contraria et habent genera propinqua sub quibus continentur, quaedam conveniunt in sensu vel intellectu <...>⁴⁵, et quaedam differunt. Et collegerunt ex eis intentionem convenientiae et intentionem diversitatis, et posuerunt unam ex eis genus quorundam, et alteram posuerunt genus aliorum.

illam rem mobilem, quamvis non sit ibi contrarietas. Magnum autem et parvum inter quae movetur vegetabile et arescibile non est ipsum parvum et magnum relatum absolute, sed quasi natura posuerit speciebus sensibilibus et vegetabilibus terminos in magnitudine et terminos in parvitate quos non excedunt et moventur inter eos: ergo magnum ibi erit magnum absolute, et non erit parvum comparatione alterius magni in eadem specie; similiter autem parvum erit parvum absolute ».

⁴⁴ The identity of this group of philosophers is unclear. A. Bertolacci, in the notes to his Italian translation of Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt* (*Avicenna, Libro della guarigione. Le cose divine*, UTET, Torino 2008, p. 582), proposes tentatively to identify them with Pythagorean philosophers, since the argument of VII.1 bears some resemblances to a Pythagorean argument refuted by Avicenna in III.6 (p. 128.12-16). For an analysis of this latter argument, see A. BERTOLACCI, *Metafisica A 5, 986 a22-26 nell' Ilāhiyyāt del Kitāb al-Šifā' di Ibn Sīnā*, « Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale », 10, 1999, pp. 205-231.

⁴⁵ The Latin text omits part of Cairo, lines 10-11, reading « some are incongruent, some others are congruent in affirmation, others differ in distinction » (« et quaedam differunt et quaedam conveniunt in affirmatione et alia in distinctione », according to S. Van Riet's translation). This passage is expunged by A. Bertolacci, on the basis of manuscript evidence, in his Italian translation of the *Ilāhiyyāt* (*Avicenna, Libro della guarigione cit., Correzioni dell'edizione del Cairo dell'Ilāhiyyāt*, p. 122).

Sed non debet ita esse. Nam sensus convenientiae et diversitatis est <...>⁴⁶ ut, cum posita fuerint quasi duae naturae, invenientur eis aliqua quae diversis respectibus apta sint poni quasi genera eorum. Ipsa enim continentur sub universitate potentialium agendi et patiendi quodam modo, et sub qualitatibus alio modo, et sub relationibus alio modo. Ipsa enim, secundum hoc quod proveniunt ex rebus quae sunt potentiae agendi, et secundum hoc quod acquiruntur in aliquo ex aliquibus quae sunt potentiae patiendi, et secundum hoc quod de illis quiescunt dispositiones in suis sustentibus, sunt de qualitatibus, sed, secundum hoc quod conveniens est conveniens suo convenienti, sunt de relativis. Cum autem nomen rei quae est de convenientia vel diversitate fuerit reductum ad aliquam istarum intentionum, continebitur sub genere quod est ei proprium. Non dico autem quod una res contineatur sub diversis generibus (hoc enim est quod ego refugio), sed quia diversis respectibus una res est aliud et aliud et continetur in alia parte, nec sunt haec certa genera, sed sunt quasi genera, quia sunt res compositae ex intentione et actione vel passione vel relatione et aliis, et videtur quod in seipsis sunt qualitates, et ceteri respectus comitantur ea ».

The doctrinal core of this text is not identical with the one found in Albert's quotation, but might have inspired it: we find here, clearly spelled, the idea that congruent and incongruent things are 'by themselves' qualities (*in seipsis* [...] *qualitates*), whereas other considerations of them (for instance as actions/affections and relations) are superadded as concomitants. Then, as an alternative to Grignaschi's hypothesis, Albert might either have read *Samā' ṭabī'ī*, II.3, as suggested by Janssens; or he might have found Avicenna's idea that contraries are absolute qualities (as a source for T8) and that contrariety is somehow a relational property of theirs (as a source for T11) in this very passage of the *Ilāhiyyāt*; as to the expression *comparationis forma*, it might have resulted from the parallel reading of another Avicennan passage, which I will discuss shortly (§4.1).

4. RELATIVES

4.1 Are relatives a category? The matter of Avicenna's conceptualism

The fourth treatise of Albert's *De praedicamentis*, devoted to the category of relatives, is opened by two chapters, corresponding to two digressions which certainly are to be numbered amongst the most original and interesting pages

⁴⁶ The Latin text omits a part of Cairo, lines 13-14, which reads « [is] the sense of concomitants, since they do not belong to things by themselves but by relation. Then, congruent and incongruent things » (« sensus comitantium quia non sunt rebus in seipsis sed per relationem deinde convenientia et diversa », according to S. Van Riet's translation).

of Albert's commentary⁴⁷. In the first digression Albert, while answering a series of doubts, tries to decide whether relatives may be properly said to be a category; in the second, he reflects again over the ontological status of relations, and on the division of the genus 'relative' into its subordinate genera, species and individuals. The difficulty on which the first digression is based comes from the ancient philosophers' disagreement concerning the generic nature of relatives: according to a certain 'Zeno', and some other unspecified thinkers, relation is not a separate being, but a thing (*res*) or 'notion' (*ratio*) resulting from a 'comparison', or connection (*comparatio*) between two things belonging to other categories, which is 'intermingled' (*immixtum*) with them; since however the categories classify the primary meanings of separate being, and the nature of relatives implies their being 'contaminated' with the other categories, according to them relatives may not be numbered among the highest genera of being⁴⁸. This opinion is confirmed, in Albert's account, by a set of further arguments ascribed to Zeno — except for the last one, which is attributed to Avicenna and al-Fārābī. Before discussing the Avicennan argument, I will sum up the previous ones:

[1] If A is compared to B, it must be compared either by itself or by means of something else; however, it is surely not compared by itself, since otherwise everything would be relative. There must be, then, a certain *ratio* of comparison, C, the existence of which is therefore understood intellectually before a comparison effectively takes place. But what is such as to be intellected before the accident cannot be a genus of the accident. Therefore relatives are not a genus of being⁴⁹.

[2] No true accident may be an accident of something else; thus, since the *comparatio* of relatives accidentally belongs to the other accidents, relatives are not a true accident (a category)⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ Albert's doctrine of relations already was the subject of dedicated contributions: see for instance J. BROWER, *Relations Without Polyadic Properties: Albert the Great on the Nature and Ontological Status of Relations*, « Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie », 83, 2001, pp. 225-257. Brower also discusses Albert's theory in his entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (*Medieval Theories of Relations*, in E. N. ZALTA ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [Winter 2015 Edition], URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/relations-medieval/>). For an analysis of the main post-albertine theories of relations see M. G. HENNINGER, *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250-1325*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989.

⁴⁸ ALB., *De praed.*, 4.1, p. 80.7-14: « Zeno enim et quidam alii hoc praedicamentum dicebant non esse praedicamentum, sed rem vel rationem aliis praedicamentis immixtam ex eorum ad invicem comparatione. Et cum prima genera sint voces prima rerum genera significantes, hoc autem genus non significetur ut ens ab aliis separatum sed ut aliis immixtum, videtur ei quod significatum eius non sit ens, quod sit de primis partibus entis ».

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.15-36.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 80.37-40.

[3] Relatives also belong to all things as a consequence of all things' being subdivided into genera and species, or their being wholes and parts; being such a derived property (*coaccidens*) it cannot be a genus for itself⁵¹.

[4] The fact that genera, species and all predicables are found relatively in all things does not imply that generality, specificity, and the like are genera for themselves. For this reason, relatives as well are not to be numbered as an independent genus, but only as a certain accident found in other genera (*generum aliorum quoddam accidens*)⁵².

From all these arguments, somewhat obscure and sophistical, it may be inferred that Zeno's doctrine identifies relation as a *tertium quid* beyond the relative extremes (which, under many respects, leads to deny to it the status of a category). Though at first he seems to keep the alternative open, whether it has real or mental existence (*rem vel rationem*), argument [1] apparently inclines towards a conceptualist account⁵³.

After the proofs attributed to Zeno and his followers, as I said, Albert proposes a further related argument, attributed to Avicenna and Fārābī. Quite interestingly, this argument again denies to relatives the status of a category, on the basis of a conceptualist theory:

T11 : ALBERT, *De praed.*, IV.1, p. 81.4-21:

« Adhuc autem fortius obiecerunt quidam posteriorum sicut AVICENNA et ALFARABIUS dicentes quod nulla forma, quae sit ens, est in re, quae non sit absoluta secundum esse, quod habet in ipsa, sicut patet inducendo de calido, frigido, albo, nigro, dulci, amaro et omnibus aliis; sed comparatio, quae fit rerum ad invicem secundum formas, quae insunt rebus, fit actu rationis, quae dicit quod, in quibus est una qualitas, sunt similia, et in quibus non est una, sunt dissimilia vel differentia; comparationis ergo forma, quae est in his, quae sunt ad aliquid, non est res sed ratio, ut videtur, quae nihil est extra animam comparantis unum alteri. Generalissima prima genera rerum significant; ad aliquid autem non est ens ratum apud naturam extra, sed ens rationis; ad aliquid ergo non potest esse generalissimum ».

The mention of Fārābī is certainly doubtful, since in the Farabian works surely known to Albert there is no such indication of Fārābī's belief in the intellectual nature of relatives⁵⁴. As to Avicenna, among the quotations found in the *De*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.41-45.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 80.46 - 81.3.

⁵³ J. Brower (*Relations Without Polyadic Properties* cit., p. 231) also takes most of these arguments to be substantially anti-realist.

⁵⁴ This is also remarked by Janssens: see *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance* cit., p. 247 (where Janssens qualifies Grignaschi's statement as « purement hypothétique »).

praedicamentis this is for sure the most problematic. It seems clear, in fact, from Avicenna's treatment of relatives in the *Ilāhiyyāt*, that he does not hold relations to have a merely intellectual character; on the contrary, he explicitly affirms their ontological reality⁵⁵. Grignaschi, though recognizing that Avicenna is not, strictly speaking, a conceptualist, quotes as a possible source of this doctrine a passage of *Maqūlāt*, IV.3 where Avicenna, according to him, would state that it is easier to conceive of relation as of a mental thing, than of a concrete being⁵⁶. He also mentions another place of *Maqūlāt*, IV.5 which, according to him, could be understood as a denial of the concrete existence of relation⁵⁷. Janssens, like Grignaschi, notes that Avicenna actually denies to relatives a purely intellectual existence, but he holds at the same time that Albert might have taken inspiration from a certain passage of the *Philosophia prima*, which I will discuss shortly⁵⁸.

It must be noted, at first, that Grignaschi misunderstands the Arabic text of the Avicennan sentence he quotes: Avicenna does not say, in the mentioned passage of *Maqūlāt*, IV.3, that relatives are more easily conceivable as existing intellectually; he actually says that the comprehension of *relative things* (*muḍāfāt*), inasmuch as they are concrete things, is easier than the comprehension of *abstract relations* (*muḡarrad al-iḍāfāt*)⁵⁹: that is why Avicenna (and also Aristotle, according to him) speaks of *relatives*, in the context of an introductory work like the *Categories* are. As for the other Avicennan passage, it must be read in its context (in Grignaschi's article only the underlined part is reported)⁶⁰:

⁵⁵ AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia Prima*, III.10, p. 179.31-32: «In signatis autem multa sunt huiusmodi, quia in signatis est ad aliquid». See also the note *ad loc.* in the *editio coloniensis* («notandum est quod Avicenna ipse opinionem repellit alicuius 'sectae' quae tenuit 'quod certitudo relativorum non est nisi in anima cum intelliguntur res'»). The same holds J. Brower (*Relations Without Polyadic Properties* cit.). More in general, concerning Avicenna's doctrine of relatives in *Maqūlāt* and *Ilāhiyyāt*, see H. ZGHAL, *La relation chez Avicenne*, «Arabic Sciences and Philosophy», 16, 2006, pp. 237-286. On the Latin fortune of Avicenna's doctrine on relation see J. DECORTE, *Avicenna's ontology of relation, a source of inspiration to Henry of Ghent*, in J. JANSSENS, D. DE SMET eds., *Avicenna and his heritage. Acts of the international colloquium* (September 8- September 11 1999), Leuven University Press, Leuven 2002, pp. 196-224.

⁵⁶ GRIGNASCHI, *Les traductions latines* cit., p. 72: «À son tour, Avicenne a remarqué qu'il était plus facile de considérer les relations comme un rapport établi par la raison que de comprendre celle qui existent dans les choses».

⁵⁷ AVIC., *Maqūlāt*, IV.5, p. 161.4-8: see below, T12.

⁵⁸ JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance* cit., p. 247. See below, T12.

⁵⁹ The Arabic reads, in fact (*Maqūlāt*, IV.3, p. 144.1-2): *wa-l-wuḡūfu 'alā l-muḍāfāti ashālū 'alā l-ḡihni min al-wuḡūfi 'alā muḡarradi l-iḍāfāti llati hiya l-maḡūlatu* («the comprehension of relatives is easier, for the mind, than the comprehension of the abstract relations which are the category»).

⁶⁰ GRIGNASCHI, *Les traductions latines* cit., p. 72 note 45.

T12: AVICENNA, *Maqūlāt*, IV.5, p. 161.4-8:

« Thus, if the relative is that which does have no existence but being relative, it follows that if one of the two extremes is determined in a certain way (*huṣṣila aḥadu ʔarafayhī taḥṣīlan*) the other is determined because of it; so that if you say ‘double’ absolutely, indeterminately, you figure out in front of it ‘half’, indeterminately; if you say ‘a double that is four’ you figure out in front of it ‘a half that is two’. Our saying ‘determination of the relative’ (*taḥṣīl al-muḍāf*) is an expression by which we [may] understand [many] meanings. We must make a premise, before explaining this: we say that a relative does not have separate⁶¹ existence, but its existence consists of being attached to things; and it is specified by the specification of this being-attached. The specification of this being-attached is understood in two ways: one of them consists of taking the substrate of attachment (*al-malḥūq*) and the relation together; so this consists of a category and a category, and it is not a category, but it is composed by a category and a category. The other way consists of taking, as associated with the relation, a certain way of that proper, intellectual being-attached, and of taking them together as a single accident for the substrate of attachment. This is the specification of relation (*tanwīʿ al-iḍāfa*), and its determination ».

This passage comes from the second part of chapter IV.5, where Avicenna deals with the second definition of relatives found in *Categories*, 7: relatives as things for which ‘being is the same as being somehow related to something’, in Ackrill’s translation⁶². After highlighting the difference between this definition and the previous one, Avicenna tackles the Aristotelian statement that, according to this latter definition, « if someone knows any relative definitely he will also know definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of » (*man ʔarafa aḥada l-muḍāfayni muḥaṣṣalan, ʔarafa llaḍī ilayhi yuḍāfu muḥaṣṣalan*, in Ishāq b. Ḥunayn’s Arabic translation)⁶³. He then turns to clarify the meaning of ‘determination’ at stake here: to determine relatives means to ‘specify’ them, in the technical sense, apparently, of ‘dividing into species’ (*tanwīʿ*). Since relation has no independent existence, but is always attached to something, what needs to be specified is the modality of attachment. One possible way consists of specifying the category to which the relation is attached: ‘relation’, when attached to quality, produces ‘similarity’; ‘relation’, when attached to quantity, produces ‘equivalence’; and so on. Avicenna’s statement that this specification is ‘composite’ seems to entail that he is tacitly dismissing it. The second way is formulated in rather

⁶¹ Grignaschi reads *munfarid* instead of *mufrad* (Cairo).

⁶² ARIST., *Cat.*, 8a31-35.

⁶³ K. GEORR, *Les Catégories d’Aristote dans leurs versions syro-arabes*, Institut Français de Damas, Beyrouth 1948, p. 338.3-4.

obscure and vague terms: it implies, apparently, that a relation may be specified intellectually in its own right, in a way which is not dependent on the subject of the relation⁶⁴. The two ways might be exemplified by the beginning of *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, where Avicenna presents three ways of dividing relatives: (1) according to their being found in certain categories, (2) according to notions such as 'equality', 'action/passion', 'assimilation' etc.; and (3) in a third way, which depends on the necessity that a certain thing exists in relatives for a relation to subsist between them⁶⁵. Whereas the first way of T12 corresponds to (1), the second way might be interpreted with respect to (2) or (3).

It is however clear that text T12 does not state the intellectual nature of relations: the claim that relatives have no 'separate' existence does not necessarily imply their mental existence (all accidents have, in a larger sense, non-separate existence, but they certainly exist in reality), nor does imply it their possibility of being specified according to a certain 'intellectual' consideration. Although this is sufficient to disprove Grignaschi's hypothesis, both the issue of Avicenna's alleged conceptualism and the reason for Albert's quotation must be inspected more in detail.

A detailed presentation of Avicenna's theory of relation (as expounded in chapter III.10 of the *Ilāhiyyāt*, and in *Maqūlāt*, IV.3-5) would require a contribution for itself: I will try nonetheless to resume it, as to what concerns the scope of the present enquiry⁶⁶. In *Maqūlāt*, IV.3-5 Avicenna refuses explicitly to tackle the question of the existence of relations, since — as he states clearly — it is not worth being discussed in a logical work⁶⁷. In passages such as T12 and its

⁶⁴ This is the conclusion of H. Zghal, who interprets this passage by means of a parallel reading of AVIC., *Ġadal*, V.3, pp. 263.10 – 264.11: « Le recours à ce passage du *Ġadal* permet d'élucider la notion d'une 'spécification idéale du relatif par son mode d'advention'. Il situe cette diversification à un niveau conceptuel et sans faire intervenir aucune variante empirique. 'Le mode d'advention' de la relation appartient à la relation elle-même sans que le sujet dont elle peut être l'accident à un niveau factuel, ou le prédicat à un niveau logique, ne soit concerné par sa diversification » (ZGHAL, *La relation chez Avicenne* cit., p. 266).

⁶⁵ AVIC., *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, pp. 152.7 – 154.6.

⁶⁶ *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10 is analysed in M. E. MARMURA, *Avicenna's Chapter 'On the Relative' in the Metaphysics of the Shifā'*, in G. F. HOURANI ed., *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science*, State University of New York Press, Albany 1975, pp. 83-99; for a more specific focus on the *Ilāhiyyāt* see also A. BÄCK, *Avicenna on Relations and the Bradleyan Regress*, in J. BIARD, I. ROSIER-CATACH eds., *La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XII-XV siècles)*, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie - Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve - Louvain - Paris 2003, pp. 69-84. A detailed analysis and comparison of *Maqūlāt* and *Ilāhiyyāt* is found instead in ZGHAL, *La relation chez Avicenne* cit. Avicenna's doctrine of relatives is also briefly discussed in R. STROBINO, *Avicenna on Knowledge ('Ilm), Certainty (Yaqīn), Cause ('Ilā/Sabab) and the Relative (Muḍāf)*, « British Journal for the History of Philosophy », 24, 2016, pp. 426-446.

⁶⁷ AVIC., *Maqūlāt*, IV.3, p. 143.15-16.

follow-up, for the rest, Avicenna insists on the conceptualization of relatives and their intellectual determination; he also states, at a given point, that 'relation' is determined in the intellect (without however suggesting elsewhere that this implies the intellectual existence of relative things)⁶⁸. In *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, on the contrary, Avicenna tackles this ontological issue, and presents the doctrines of two different school of thoughts: those who believe that relatives exist in concrete beings, and those who believe that relatives are such only when they are intellected by the mind. He then expounds the arguments of both schools: realists argue that relatives are evidently existent in reality⁶⁹, whereas the conceptualists present two anti-realist arguments. The first is an argument of infinite regress: if 'fatherhood' is a concretely existent relation, which ties the relatives 'father' and 'son', it presupposes the existence of other relations (for example, the inherence of 'fatherhood' in 'father') which in turn presuppose other relations, and so on *ad infinitum*⁷⁰. The second argument is based on the fact that relations may connect something existent and something non-existent (as, for instance, does the relation of priority and posteriority), which demonstrates their exclusively mental existence⁷¹. After presenting these proofs, Avicenna begins a refutation of the first anti-realist argument. He recalls the 'absolute definition' of relatives, namely the first definition found in the *Categories* (according to Ishāq ibn Hunayn's interpretative translation): relative is that which has its quiddity said with respect to something else (*alladī māhiyyatuhū innamā tuqālu bi-l-qiyāsi ilā ḡayrihī*)⁷². It is then clear, according to Avicenna, that in concrete reality there are many sensible things bearing such nature; this is, by the way, a tacit confirmation of the argument by self-evidence

⁶⁸ AVIC., *Maqūlāt*, IV.5, p. 163.3.

⁶⁹ AVIC., *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, p. 156.8-12 (AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, III.10, pp. 178.7 - 179.15: « Nos scimus quod haec res in esse est pater illius, et ille in esse est filius eius, sive intelligatur, sive non intelligatur; et scimus etiam quod plantae inquirunt nutrimentum; inquisitio vero est cum relatione aliqua, sed herbae non habent intellectum ullo modo nec apprehensionem, Et scimus etiam quod ipsum caelum est super terram et terra est inferius eo, sive apprehendatur, sive non; et relatio non est nisi ad similitudinem eius quod assignavimus de istis, et haec est rebus, quamvis non apprehendatur »).

⁷⁰ AVIC., *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, p. 156.13-18 (AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, III.10, p. 179.15-23).

⁷¹ AVIC., *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, pp. 156.18 - 157.2 (AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, III.10, p. 179.23-25).

⁷² Ishāq's translation of the *Categories* reads: « It is said of things that they are relative when their quiddities are said with respect to something else, or according to a certain other sort of connection to something else, whatsoever » (in GEORR, *Les Catégories d'Aristote* cit., p. 332.18-19). The original Greek wording conveys a weaker meaning, which does not properly rely on the notion of essence: Πρὸς τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἔστιν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον. (« We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else »).

attributed, above, to the 'realist' school. He then proceeds to clarify that relatives are always relative *per se*, not in virtue of another — external — relation which accompanies them: it is the very non-existence of a real, intermediate relation which allows him to invalidate the conceptualists' argument. Every relative is such *per se* in concrete reality, and is specified by itself — not by a 'togetherness' or 'being-with'⁷³ other than its own. However, since every relative is such that, when it is intellected, its relative counterpart must be intellected as well, the intellect may invent a super-added relation, which apparently ties the two extremes, but in fact has no correspondence in external reality⁷⁴. Thus, relatives — according to Avicenna — exist in concrete beings, though *sub condicione*, since their existence in concrete reality entails a certain way of conceptualizing them: as a matter of fact, every relative is such that — whenever it is known intellectually — its relative counterpart is also immediately known⁷⁵. Towards the end of the chapter, while discussing the second argument brought forth by the 'conceptualist' school, Avicenna seems to endorse it, thus recognizing that there are some relatives which may only exist intellectually (prior and posterior). It is exactly this acceptance, stated right at the end of *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, that Janssens suggests to be a likely source for Albert's quotation in T11. The passage is indeed a good candidate, inasmuch as it presents us with a wording similar to T11:

T13: AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, III.10, pp. 192.89 - 193.98 (= *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, pp. 159.17 - 160.6):

«Scias autem quod res in se non est prius, nisi eo quod est simul cum ea, et hoc species prioris et posterioris est cum utraque sunt simul in intellectu. Cum enim praesentatur in intellectu forma prioris et posterioris, intelligit anima hanc comparisonem incidere inter duo quae sunt in intellectu quoniam haec comparatio est inter duo quae sunt in intellectu. Sed ante hoc, res in se non est prior; quomodo enim erit prior re quae non habet esse? Igitur quae fuerint de relativis secundum hunc modum, non erit eorum relatio nisi in intellectu; nec intelligitur existere in esse secundum hanc prioritatem et posterioritatem».

⁷³ *Ma 'iyya* (from *ma 'a*, 'with'), meaning a relative's being said and intellected *together with* another thing.

⁷⁴ AVIC., *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, p. 158.6-12 (AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, III.10, pp. 180.52 - 181.62: «Si autem hoc relatum accipiatur in signatis, habebit esse cum alia re per se, non egens alio cum quod sequitur ipsum; sed ipsa est ipsum cum, vel cum appropriatum specie illius relationis, ut, ad hoc ut intelligatur, egeat intelligi cum praesentatione alterius rei, sicut quidditas paternitatis, inquantum paternitas, est relata per se, non per aliam relationem ligantem. Intellectus enim habet adinvenire aliquid inter ea duo, quasi cum sit extra ea duo, quod aliquid adinvenire formatio non fecit necessarium, sed alius ex respectibus sequentibus, quos facit intellectus. Intellectus enim coniungit res cum rebus, propter diversitatem respectuum, non propter necessitatem»).

⁷⁵ AVIC., *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, p. 159.3-6 (AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, III.10, pp. 181.70 - 182.74).

Still, it must be noted that the expression *comparationis forma* (relative form, or comparative form) in T11 also recalls *De praed.* III.11 (T8), where it was mentioned with regard to contraries. Likewise, it must be observed that the examples attributed to Avicenna and Fārābī in T11 concern again, as in T8, contrary qualities (hot and cold, black and white, sweet and bitter), intellected as relative inasmuch as they are ‘similar’ or ‘dissimilar’. Moreover, the distinction between ‘similar’ and ‘dissimilar’ in T11 might echo, superficially, the one between *convenientia* and *diversitas* which I highlighted in the aforementioned passage of *Ilāhiyyāt*, VII.1 (T10). On account of all this, Albert’s quotation in T11 might be inspired by the same source of T8, without necessarily depending on a reading of *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10; or else, more likely, Avicenna’s doctrine of *comparationis forma* could be the result of a parallel reading, on Albert’s part, of T10 and T13. In any case, Albert would make recourse in T11 to texts of Avicenna’s *Ilāhiyyāt*, without any involvement of *Maqūlāt*.

To sum up, there may be found, in Avicenna’s ‘realist’ account of relatives, some concessions to conceptualism: first, the fact that the existence of relatives entails their being conceptualized in a certain manner; secondly, the notion of a super-added relation made up by the intellect, as it knows two relatives together, to justify their existential interdependence; thirdly, the acceptance of some merely intellectual types of relatives, such as priority and posteriority (as objected by conceptualists themselves). The fact remains, however, that in *De praed.*, IV.1 Albert presents Avicenna’s thought in a simplified, distorted and apparently instrumental fashion. Zeno and his followers deny to relatives the status of a category, which Avicenna never does explicitly; they hold relation to be an intermediate entity subsisting between its extremes, which Avicenna expressly denies more than once⁷⁶. If this distortion is unintentional, it is nothing but a simple misunderstanding, eased by the objective difficulty of Avicenna’s explanations in the *Ilāhiyyāt*. If, on the other hand, it is conscious and intentional, as I am more inclined to believe, there is reason to see here on Albert’s part a dialectical or even rhetorical use of quotations. This is made particularly clear by the follow-up of the text, as Albert remarks that the ‘intellectual’ conception of relatives was supported by almost all philosophers except Plato, Aristotle and himself⁷⁷. Albert might well have presented Avicenna

⁷⁶ AVIC., *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10, pp. 154.7 - 155.16 (AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, III.10, pp. 175.20 - 177.95); *Maqūlāt*, IV.5, pp. 163.11 - 164.5.

⁷⁷ ALB., *De praed.*, IV.1, p. 81.22-31: «Ex his et similibus rationibus moti fuerunt antiqui et fere omnes praeter Platonem et Aristotelem, qui dixerunt ad aliquid non esse genus, quod sit prima pars accidentis vel una de primis, sed dixerunt ipsum ex habitudinis aliorum generum ad invicem per actum rationis comparantis unum ad alterum omnibus aliis esse immixtum. Et haec opinio corda adhuc obtinuit multorum, ita quod dicunt ad aliquid non esse unum de generibus primis, sicut tangit Averroes super V primae philosophiae Aristotelis». Albert’s mention of Plato may be justified by the fact that the first definition of relatives found in *Cat.*, 7 is often attributed, in the exegetical tradition, to Aristotle’s teacher (see BOETHIUS, *In Cat. Arist.* 2, PL 64, p. 217C).

as an illustrious advocate of the opposite doctrine so as to stress, somehow, his own independence; or, as J. Brower has suggested, he might have thought Avicenna to provide a potentially strong argument in favour of the conceptualist view⁷⁸. For cases like this, however, Albert's distortion of Avicenna's thought might also be a signal of the effective unavailability to him of an Avicennan treatment of the *Categories*, and the result of Albert's attempt to 'reconstruct' *ex post* Avicenna's doctrine on the basis of other texts.

That this is an instrumental way of quoting Avicenna, and that Albert has instead well understood Avicenna's doctrine, is made clearer, in my opinion, both (a) by the follow-up of Albert's discussion, where Avicenna is quoted again, this time as a favourable source, and (b) by Albert's own conception of relatives, as expounded in *De praed.*, IV.1 and in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which seems positively influenced by Avicenna's true position.

(a) After presenting the wrong opinions of Zeno and his followers it is necessary, according to Albert, to re-establish the truth: relatives are a genus, and one of the highest accidental genera. There are, as a matter of fact, two sorts of accidents: those which are absolute, and simply accompany the being of the subject in its substance, like quantity and quality; and those which accompany the thing on account of something extrinsic, which is related to substance itself; among these, there are relatives. The promoters of this bipartition of the accident are, according to Albert, Porphyry, Aristotle and Avicenna:

T14: ALBERT, *De praed.*, IV.1, p. 81.32-53:

«Nos autem Platoni et Aristoteli consentientes dicimus ad aliquid esse generalissimum et esse unum de primis generibus accidentis, eo quod tam PORPHYRIUS quam etiam ARISTOTELES et AVICENNA dicunt quod accidens, duobus modis praedicatur de eo, cuius est accidens, et duobus modis causatur a subiecto. Quoddam enim est forma absoluta et non per aliud est accidens, nisi quia in subiecto sequitur perfectum esse subiecti in suis substantialibus; et ideo est accidens, quia non potest esse de substantia rei, quod perfectum esse sequitur, et sic quantitas est accidens et qualitas et huiusmodi. Quoddam autem est accidens, non quia sequatur esse rei perfectum, sed quia sequitur ad rem non gratia substantialium, sed ex aliquo quod est extrinsecus se habens ad rei substantialia, sicut ad hoc, quod aliquid sic se habet ut primum et aliud ut secundum vel unum ut totum et aliud ut pars vel ut conveniens vel differens ab illo, sequitur ab extrinseco quod unum sit comparabile ad aliud secundum ipsam rem. Quae comparatio ad actum reducitur, quando actu per rationem comparantur. Et a tali accidente, quod sic accidit rebus, proprie causatur ad aliquid [...]».

⁷⁸ BROWER, *Relations Without Polyadic Properties* cit., p. 234: «Although Albert traces this anti-realist objection to Avicenna and Alfarabi, it is unclear from the text whether he thinks these philosophers actually reject realism, or merely supply the most powerful objection to it».

Being Porphyry the first mentioned authority, the editors thought Albert to be referring to the distinction between separable and inseparable accident, found both in Porphyry's *Isagoge* and in Avicenna's *Logica*⁷⁹. In this latter text, moreover, the terms of the distinction resemble those employed by Albert in this chapter of the *De praedicamentis*⁸⁰. This distinction, however, is by itself not easily and coherently applicable to the distinction alluded to by Albert, which rather seems to be a sort of division of the accidental categories. Albert might have overlapped to the Porphyrian distinction⁸¹ another two-fold division of the accidents, that which is found in the metaphysical section of Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid* (actually corresponding to the brief 'division' of accidental categories found in Avicenna's *Dānešnāme-ye 'Alā'ī*)⁸². The bipartition between accidents conceptualized by themselves, and accidents conceptualized in relation to something else is also the basis of the more articulate division of the categories found in Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*⁸³. It is — however — difficult to explain the attribution of this doctrine to Avicenna only (not also to Algazel), unless we hold either that Albert was able to hypothesize the Avicennan character of this doctrine because of its presence in Ġazālī's text, or that he actually read Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*.

(b) As to Albert's own conception of relatives, it might be influenced by Avicenna's doctrine, and would thus betray a much deeper understanding of *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.10. As a matter of fact, Albert's solution presents us with the same 'intermediate' ontological character as Avicenna's:

⁷⁹ PORPH., *Isag.*, pp. 12.23 - 13.3 Busse (ARIST. LAT., p. 20.7-12): « Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Dividitur autem in duo, in separabile et in inseparabile; namque dormire est separabile accidens, nigrum vero esse inseparabiliter corvo et Aethiopi accidit (potest autem subintellegi et corvus albus et Aethiops amittens colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem) ».

⁸⁰ AVIC., *Logica*, p. 4vb. The distinction is also found in Ġazālī's *Logica*: pp. 248.72 - 249.88.

⁸¹ Another distinction alluded to here could be the Stoic distinction between πρὸς τι and πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχοντα, variously found in the late ancient commentaries on the *Categories*; I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.

⁸² ALG., *Philosophia*, pp. 19.15 - 20.8 Muckle: « Necessarium est dividere accidentia, post divisionem substanciarum; primum autem dividuntur in duo, quoniam quedam eorum sunt quorum essentia nullo modo per se potest intelligi, nisi aliquid aliud extrinsecus intelligatur; et quedam eorum sunt que per se intelligi possunt; et hec dividuntur in duas species, quantitatem scilicet et qualitatem [...] Ea vero que non possunt per se intelligi sine respectu aliorum, septem sunt, scilicet relacio, ubi, quando, situs, habere, agere et pati ». The corresponding passage of Avicenna's *Dānešnāme* is the following: AVICENNE, *Livre de science*, trad. M. ACHENA, H. MASSÉ, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1955-1958, vol. I, pp. 108-110.

⁸³ AVIC., *Maqūlāt*, II.5, pp. 84.4 - 86.12. A recent discussion of Avicenna's division of the categories is found in P. THOM, *The division of the categories according to Avicenna*, in A. ALWISHAH, J. HAYES eds., *Aristotle and the Arabic tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, pp. 30-49.

T15: ALBERT, *De praed.*, IV.1, p. 82.34-45:

«Ad hoc autem quod posterius obiciunt, dicendum videtur quod comparationem dupliciter est considerare, secundum aptitudinem scilicet et secundum actum. Secundum aptitudinem quidem est in rebus [...]. Secundum actum autem comparatio est in ratione vel anima comparantis, et actus ille non facit quod non secundum aptitudinem sit in rebus comparatis, et ideo secundum aptitudinem quidem est in rebus, secundum perfectionem autem est in ratione. Et hoc multos decepit in isto praedicamento».

Relative things do have, in concrete reality, a certain *aptitudo* (which we could understand as 'predisposition') to being relative, which is perfected when they are intellected. Relations are not, therefore, entirely intellectual entities: though the *perfectio* of their being lies in their being intellected, they are by themselves already disposed to being relative, in extra-mental reality. Furthermore, in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Albert states even more clearly that relations as such exist in the mind, but there are concrete, individual *respectus* which inhere in relative things⁸⁴. Albert's position resembles then Avicenna's true doctrine, in that Albert holds relatives to be somehow existent in reality, but also to have a certain, complementary intellectual realization.

4.2 *Sense-perception and the animal soul*

There are two further passages, in the fourth treatise of *De praedicamentis*, which are held by Grignaschi to draw directly on Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*. The first (ch. IV.7), which I have already briefly mentioned, is not an Avicennan quotation, since the reading 'Avicenna' has to be corrected, according to the manuscripts, in 'Augustinus'⁸⁵. The second, in the same chapter, concerns Aristotle's arguments on the simultaneous existence of relatives. In fact, in the *Categories* Aristotle mentions two cases of relatives which seem to contradict this rule. The two cases are that of the couple 'knowable-knowledge' and that of the couple 'sensible-sensation': the knowable is prior to knowledge, since whereas the knowable may exist even without knowledge, there can be no knowledge without something knowable. The same also holds for sensible and sensation: if a sensible is destroyed, sensation is destroyed as well; but, if sensation is destroyed (for instance, if an animal capable of perception dies) what is sensible

⁸⁴ ALB., *Metaph.*, V.3.7, p. 266.79-83: «Et ideo relatio, ut dicunt, est in anima; respectus autem est res signata in re ipsa, et hic respectus communi nomine significatur, cum dicitur ad aliquid, et hoc modo est et ens et genus quoddam entis».

⁸⁵ See above, §1.

remains⁸⁶. With regard to Aristotle's remark that 'an animal and perception come into existence at the same time'⁸⁷, Albert briefly quotes a corresponding doctrine of Avicenna, who holds that animals are essentially characterized by sense-perception:

T16: ALBERT, *De praed.*, IV.7, p. 95.33-36:

« *Amplius ad hoc idem facit quod sensus fit cum sensato sive eo quod habet sensum — hoc enim sensatum dicimus —; simul enim fit animal cum sensu, quia propter sensum dicitur et est animal, ut dicit AVICENNA* ».

According to Grignaschi, this passage would have a 'literal' correspondence in the *Categories* of the *Šifā'*: in particular, it would be related to *Maqūlāt*, IV.4, a chapter devoted to the properties of relatives and notably their simultaneity⁸⁸. In this chapter, Avicenna in fact discusses Aristotle's doubt, and reflects over the status of knowable and knowledge, sensible and sensation. However, in the passage suggested by Grignaschi Avicenna, though making the same point as Aristotle's, does not mention animals as an example of perceptible beings:

T17: AVICENNA, *Maqūlāt*, IV.4, p. 151.6-9:

« The state of this sensation is conceived similarly, for⁸⁹ its essence does not separate from a relation being attributed to it, while the essence of the sensible does separate [from it]; nor it is necessary that [the sensible] be not existent when⁹⁰ the sense is not existent; for it is possible that a certain sensitive being be not existent, while the sensible elements which are principles of the generation of animals, and the other terrestrial bodies, are existent ».

Though for sure thematically related to **T16**, this passage does not exactly point to the doctrine mentioned by Albert, which rather involves that 'animal' is said to be such *because* of its being endowed with sensation. The source could be, according to Janssens and the critical editors, a passage from *Ilāhiyyāt*, V.7 (V.5 in the Latin translation), where 'sense' is assumed by Avicenna to take part in the definition of 'animal' not as a specific difference, but as a 'sign' of the difference (*dalīl 'alā l-faṣl, consignificans differentiam*), which implies that 'sense' takes part

⁸⁶ ARIST., *Cat.*, 7b15-8a12.

⁸⁷ ARIST., *Cat.*, 8a7-8 (« *Simul enim animal fit et sensus* », in Boethius' translation).

⁸⁸ GRIGNASCHI, *Les traductions latines cit.*, p. 73.

⁸⁹ Reading *fa-inna* instead of *wa-anna* (Cairo) with most manuscripts. This is also the reading adopted by Grignaschi (*Les traductions latines cit.*, p. 73 n. 47).

⁹⁰ Reading *mawǧūdān ḥīna* (Cairo) instead of *mawǧūdun āḥarun* [sic] 'in' (Grignaschi, *ibid.*).

— at least indirectly — in the essence of 'animal'⁹¹. Nonetheless, I think that the source is rather to be searched in Avicenna's *Book of the Soul*, for instance in the very *incipit* of chapter II.3, devoted to the sense of touch, which is presented by Avicenna as « *primus sensuum propter quos animal est animal* » (*awwalu l-ḥawāssi llaḍī yaṣīru bihī l-ḥayawānu ḥayawānan*)⁹². The meaning is slightly different, since Avicenna is not defining 'animal' by means of sense, but is discussing the sense-perceptions that are necessary for an animal to be such (those that characterize the 'animal soul', *nafs ḥayawāniyya*, rendered in Latin as *anima sensibilis* or *vitalis*); however, the wording is identical. Once again, then, it is not necessary to recur to the *Maqūlāt* to explain this quotation.

5. MOTION

Besides highlighting Albert's dialectical use of quotations, in section 4.1 above, I also suggested that his apparent distortions of Avicenna's doctrines might be a signal of an attempt to reconstruct *ex post* Avicenna's doctrine, on the basis of other texts. Another, indirect sign of this tendency could be represented by Albert's numerous references to works by Avicenna belonging to domains other than logic, for instance natural philosophy and metaphysics: as the table in the Appendix shows, these latter quotations represent the majority over the fewer certain references to logic. It looks as if Albert needed to refer to further texts of Avicenna in order to fill a theoretical gap, left open by the unavailability of a Latin translation of the *Maqūlāt*, as well as of most of the logic of the *Šifā'*. The last case I will present now is a further attestation of this trend: a quotation (not analysed by Grignaschi) which offers another example of both Albert's use of Avicenna's non-logical works and, at the same time, of his apparent distance from Avicenna's exegesis.

The case is that of motion, tackled by Albert in *De praed.*, VII.14-15. After having dealt with opposites and opposition, in VII.14 Albert introduces his paraphrase of the short Aristotelian chapter on motion (*Cat.*, 14)⁹³ by means of a distinction between two sorts of being: stable being (*esse stans*) and flowing being (*esse fluens*). According to Albert, after discussing the meanings of stable being (classified in categories), Aristotle would have devoted a section to flowing being, namely motion: the reason for this separate treatment would lie in the fact that, 'as Avicenna argues', flowing being may not be ordered as the other genera:

⁹¹ JANSSENS, *Albert le Grand et sa connaissance* cit., p. 248; the passage in question is *Ilāhiyyāt*, V.7, p. 237.5-6 (AVICENNA LATINUS, *Philosophia prima*, V.5, p. 266.91-92).

⁹² AVIC., *Nafs*, II.3, p. 58.1; AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber sextus de naturalibus*, II.3, p. 130.82.

⁹³ ARIST., *Cat.*, 15a13-b16.

T18: ALBERT, *De praed.*, VII.14, p. 167.15-27:

« Est autem, ut AVICENNA dicit, esse fluens, quod non est simplex actus sed permixtus potentiae, qui modus significandi esse et praedicandi ordinatione generum et specierum et individuorum determinari non potuit, eo quod omnia illa significant et praedicant, quod simpliciter suo modo actu est. Propter quod oportuit, ut hoc esse sic designatum et praedicatum in aliquo post praedicamenta consequente significaretur. Et hoc est in tot praedicamentis quot sunt, quae possunt habere res suas et esse, quod praedicant, permixtum potentiae. De hoc ergo tractantes tractabimus de motu, quantum pertinet ad praesentem speculationem; subtiliter enim de motu ad physicum tractare pertinet ».

The source of this quotation is, most probably, the *Physics* of the *Šifā*: this reference to ‘flowing being’, recalls the way Albert interprets Avicenna’s position on the categorial status of motion, according to his peculiar reading of *Samā ‘ṭabī ‘ī*, II.2⁹⁴. In this part of the *Šifā*, Avicenna actually holds, in fact, that motion is substantially coincident with the category of passion, and seems to dismiss the idea — held by some of his predecessors — that motion is a sort of ‘flowing being’⁹⁵. By contrast, in the corresponding section of Avicenna’s *Maqūlāt* (chapter VII.4) there is not such an ontological consideration of motion, and one finds an explanation for its mention in the *Categories* different from its coincidence with passion. According to Avicenna, ‘motion’ and the other expressions dealt with in the *post-praedicamenta* (‘prior and posterior’, ‘opposite’, ‘simultaneous’) are somehow used by Aristotle in explaining the categories: unlike ‘homonyms’, ‘synonyms’ and ‘paronyms’ (uncommon terms whose technical meaning had to be explained before the treatment of the categories), these other expressions have a common usage which already helps the student’s understanding: thus, the discussion of their commonly accepted meanings is postponed to the last part of the treatise, as a sort of refinement or ‘revision’ (*ta ‘qīb*) of the analysis⁹⁶. Even **T18**, then, might be a witness of Albert’s tendency to use sources other than the *Maqūlāt* to ‘reconstruct’, in a distorted way, Avicenna’s position.

⁹⁴ For an analysis of Albert’s reading of Avicenna, see A. HASNAWI, *Le statut catégorial du mouvement chez Avicenne: contexte grec et postérité médiévale latine*, in R. MORELON, A. HASNAWI eds., *De Zénon d’Élée à Poincaré. Recueil d’études en hommage à Roshdi Rashed*, Peeters, Louvain - Paris 2004, pp. 607-622.

⁹⁵ HASNAWI, *Le statut catégorial du mouvement* cit., p. 613; *Samā ‘ṭabī ‘ī*, II.2, p. 97.13.

⁹⁶ AVIC., *Maqūlāt*, VII.4, p. 273.9-14.

FINAL REMARKS

A closer inspection of these quotations does not allow us to give a conclusive answer regarding Albert the Great's reception of the Avicennan *Categories*. However, I think that we may substantially agree with Janssens in deeming it unlikely that Albert had access to a full Latin translation of *Maqūlāt*: many quotations of Grignaschi's dossier certainly (or almost certainly) rely on other works, while Grignaschi's hypothesis seems definitely viable in one case only (the relativity of contraries and the doctrine of *comparationis forma*, alluded to by Albert in texts T8 and T11). I leave of course the possibility open that, in the relevant case, the source might be an Avicennan or Latin text which escaped my attention. If it is not so, however, Albert might either have combined — as I suggested above — certain passages of Avicenna's *Philosophia prima* in order to formulate the doctrine that he ascribes to Avicenna, or rather he might have found traces of Avicenna's doctrine in *Maqūlāt* in such a work as an anthology (as Janssens suggests). Whereas there existed a widespread Latin literature of *florilegia*⁹⁷, there are comparable cases of anthological commentaries in the Arabic tradition as well, such as — for instance — the commentary on the *Categories* attributed to the philosopher 'Abdallāh al-Ḍahābī⁹⁸; or short, fragmentary translations of different works such as the *Nota ex logica Alpharabii quaedam sumpta*⁹⁹. It is not unlikely, among all possibilities, that Albert might have had access — directly or indirectly — to a similar collection of Avicennan excerpts.

Besides the material I presented, I believe there are further reasons to reject the possibility of a direct knowledge, on Albert's part, of a translation of Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*. First, as the typology of the other Avicennan quotations shows (see the Appendix), and the typology of Averroes' quotations by Albert confirms, the influence of Arabic philosophers in the *De praedicamentis* seems to be mostly unrelated to logic: the majority of nominal mentions concerns physical and metaphysical topics; Avicenna rarely seems to intervene directly in the shaping of Albert's doctrine of the *Categories*, at least not as he does in Albert's commentary on the *Isagoge*, which instead draws quite heavily on the *Madḥal* of Avicenna's *Šifā'*¹⁰⁰. Second, I believe that, had Albert known at least some of Avicenna's most radical doctrines in the *Maqūlāt* by means of a Latin translation,

⁹⁷ An example of Latin philosophical *florilegium* has been edited in J. HAMESSE, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval*, Publications Universitaires, Louvain-la-Neuve 1974.

⁹⁸ Partially edited in M. TÜRKER, *El-Âmirî ve Kategoriler'in şehirleriyle ilgili parçalar*, « Araştırma », 3, 1965, pp. 65-122.

⁹⁹ See above, *Status quaestionis*, note 3.

¹⁰⁰ In Albert's *De quinque universalibus*, Avicenna's *Logica* is quoted no less than fifty times (see ALB., *De quinque universalibus*, *Auctores ab Alberto ipso allegati*, p. 150).

he would have very likely been influenced by them, or at least prompted to some sort of reaction. Provided that Albert does not hesitate to be critical towards Avicenna in other Aristotelian commentaries (such as that on the *Metaphysics*) when necessary¹⁰¹, such issues as Avicenna's strongly ontological interpretation of the *Categories*, as well as their alleged uselessness with respect to the discipline of logic — just to mention two pivotal and originally Avicennan standpoints of the *Maqūlāt* — would probably have been an object of discussion on Albert's part¹⁰². Moreover, although the influence of Avicenna on other Latin works on the *Categories* still needs to be investigated more in detail, the explicit mentions found in other prominent commentaries, such as those by Johannes Pagus, Peter of Auvergne and John Duns Scotus, only offer either references from indirect sources (this is the case of Averroes' commentary on the *Metaphysics* in Peter of Auvergne), or recognizable references to works translated into Latin, such as the *Canon of Medicine* (Johannes Pagus¹⁰³) or the *Philosophia prima* (John Duns Scotus¹⁰⁴). A further investigation of the other commentaries will surely shed more light on the — arguably indirect — knowledge of Avicenna's *Maqūlāt* in Latin philosophy.

¹⁰¹ See BERTOLACCI, *Subtilius speculando* cit., pp. 272-286. Bertolacci shows that in Albert's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* explicit critical references to Avicenna's doctrines are mixed with implicit consensual recourse to texts of the *Philosophia prima*.

¹⁰² For Avicenna's ontological interpretation of the *Categories* see D. GUTAS, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. An Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2014, pp. 300-303. This very point has also been made by B. Tremblay (*Albertus Magnus: On the Subject of Aristotle's Categories* cit., p. 97).

¹⁰³ JOHANNES PAGUS, *Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, p. 228.6 (ed. HANSEN, *John Pagus on Aristotle's Categories* cit.).

¹⁰⁴ DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaest. super Praed.*, p. 4.13-14 (edd. R. ANDREWS, G. ETZKORN, G. GÁL, R. GREEN, T. NOONE, R. WOOD, *B. Ioannis Duns Scoti. Quaestiones in Librum Porphyrii Isagoge; Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Opera Philosophica 1, The Franciscan Institute Press, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1999).

APPENDIX

Avicenna's quotations in Albert's *De praedicamentis*: an overview

(Lines in gray correspond to the quotations of Grignaschi's *dossier*; square brackets in the last column indicate uncertain sources)

Quotation	Context	Theme	Source
[1] I.3, p. 9.14	Exegesis	Logic	<i>Logica</i>
[2] I.3, p. 10.19	Exegesis	Logic	ALGAZEL, <i>Logica</i>
[3] I.4, p. 11.20	Exegesis	Psychology	[<i>De anima</i>]
[4] I.6, p. 15.5	Exegesis	Ontology	ALGAZEL, <i>Logica</i>
[5] II.1, p. 21.60	Digression	Ontology	<i>Philosophia prima</i>
[6] II.3, p. 25.64	Exegesis	Ontology	<i>Philosophia prima</i>
[7] II.8, p. 38.17	<i>Dubitabilia</i>	Logic	<i>Logica</i>
[8] II.10, p. 41.2	Exegesis	Ontology	[<i>Liber primus naturalium</i>]
[9] III.1, p. 50.13	Digression	Physics	<i>Liber primus naturalium</i>
[10] III.7, p. 62.54	<i>Dubitabilia</i>	Physics	<i>Liber primus naturalium</i>
[11] III.11, p. 73.70	Exegesis	Ontology	[<i>Philosophia prima</i>]
[12] III.12, p. 75.64	<i>Dubitabilia</i>	Physics	PS.-AVICENNA, <i>Liber celi et mundi</i> ^a
[13] IV.1, p. 81.5	Digression	Ontology	[<i>Philosophia prima</i>]
[14] IV.1, p. 81.35	Digression	Logic/ontology	[ALGAZEL, <i>Philosophia</i>]
[15] IV.7, p. 95.36	Exegesis	Psychology	<i>De anima</i>
[16-17] VII.9, p. 156.1; 52	Digression	Ontology	<i>Philosophia prima</i> ; <i>Logica</i>
[18] VII.14, p. 167.15	Exegesis	Physics	<i>Liber primus naturalium</i>

^a This is the source proposed by Steel and Donati (see the note ad loc., p. 75), which I find convincing.

ABSTRACT

A Latin Translation? The Reception of Avicenna in Albert the Great's De praedicamentis

This paper presents an analysis of some quotations of Avicenna in Albert the Great's *De praedicamentis*. Many of these quotations have been thought by Mario Grignaschi to prove a direct knowledge, on Albert's part, of the Avicennan *Categories* (the *Maqūlāt* of his *Kitāb al-Šifā'*), a Latin translation of which is neither extant nor attested: Grignaschi presented these conclusions in a 1972 article on the Latin circulation of Arabic logical works, where he also hypothesized Albert's use of other sources apparently unknown to the Latins (al-Fārābī's *Greater commentaries* on the *Organon*, the logical sections of Avicenna's *Šifā'* posterior to the paraphrase of the *Isagoge*). Jules Janssens challenged these conclusions in a recent contribution (2013), arguing that Albert did not necessarily have access to versions of the concerned Arabic texts. The present research is thus aimed at reprising Grignaschi's dossier and Janssens' reassessment, in particular as regards Albert's *De praedicamentis* and its relation with Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*: though Janssens' conclusions are substantially confirmed, further elements of discussion are given concerning Albert's sources, his use of the quotations and his understanding of Avicenna's philosophy.

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